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CENTURY ENGLAND
Abstract: Alongside the Roman census from Augustus’ time and the
ecclesiastical surveys or polyptychs of the 8th and 9th century
Carolingian kingdoms, the Domesday Survey of 1086 occupies a most
significant place in accounting history. Domesday Book, the outcome
of the Survey, lists the incomes, tax assessments, wealth and re-
sources of most estates in England and was used as a working ac-
counting document by the monarch and public officials to raise taxes,
distribute resources and consolidate power. Although the Domesday
document itself survives, many details of its construction and use
have been lost in the mists of time. This paper describes research to
discover how taxes were levied and which estates and tenants re-
ceived favorable treatment.
INTRODUCTION
In the accounting history literature, Godfrey and Hooper
[1996] have convincingly argued that aspects of Domesday
Book, the results of a survey commissioned by William the Con-
queror, illustrate the concepts of accountability, decision-mak-
ing and control.
Domesday Book served many purposes. It documented feu-
dal tenancy arrangements and was a land register being used
extensively to resolve land disputes in the courts. Indeed, the
book’s name derives from this use. The manuscript refers to
itself as the “Discriptio”, and it was only after Williams’ death
referred to as “Domesday Book”, the book of last judgment, for
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in land disputes there was no appeal beyond its pages — land
rights could be traced to Domesday Book but no earlier.
As well as being a legal document, the book had a financial
and decision-making purpose. It lists the incomes, tax assess-
ments, wealth and resources of most estates in England and was
used as a working accounting document by the monarch and
public officials to raise taxes, distribute resources and consoli-
date power. As Godfrey and Hooper [1996, p. 51] state “By pro-
viding a valuation and audit of the resources of the feudal ten-
ants-in-chief in 1086, Domesday enabled William and his
successors to optimize both their wealth, through fiscal policy
and efficient use of the country’s resources, and their power
within the feudal structure of medieval England. For the English
monarchy of the period, Domesday served both accountability
and decision-making needs”.
Together with other ancient surveys that assisted financial
accountability, the Roman tax census during the four centuries
following Emperor Augustus and the ecclesiastical polyptychs of
the 8th and 9th centuries which were used for tax and account-
ing purposes, the Domesday Survey occupies a landmark posi-
tion in accounting history. Godfrey and Hooper [1996, p. 39]
argue, “Domesday represents a partial extension of and evolu-
tion from what might be broadly termed public sector account-
ing as practiced in both the Roman and Carolingian periods”.
Although the Domesday document itself survives, many de-
tails of its construction and use have been lost. This paper de-
scribes research to discover how the taxes were levied and
which estates and tenants received favorable treatment. Domes-
day Book records the tax assessments for the geld, a non-feudal
tax levied by the king. The tax assessments are reported in hides
and fiscal acres and are often referred to as the hidage system.
In this paper, frontier methods are used to investigate who, and
which estates, received beneficial hidation, and what factors
were associated with favorable tax assessments.
DOMESDAY ENGLAND AND THE DOMESDAY SURVEY
The Domesday Survey was carried out 20 years after Will-
iam invaded England from France. By 1086, Norman rule had
been largely consolidated, although only after rebellion and civil
dissent had been harshly put down. The Conquest was achieved
by an elite. It did not result in a mass movement of people, and,
although the Normans brought new institutions and practices,
these were superimposed on the existing order. Most of the
2
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Anglo-Saxon aristocracy were eliminated, the lands of over
4,000 English lords passing to less than 200 Norman barons,
with much of the land held by just a handful of magnates.
William I ruled forcibly through the Great Council. England
was divided into shires, or counties, which were subdivided into
hundreds. There was a sophisticated and long established shire
administration. The sheriff was the king’s agent in the county,
royal orders could be transmitted through the county and hun-
dred courts, and an effective taxation collection system was in
place.
England was a feudal state. All land belonged to the king.
He appointed tenants-in-chief, both lay and ecclesiastical, who
usually held land in return for providing a quota of fully
equipped knights. The tenants-in-chief might then grant the
land to sub-tenants in return for rents or services, or work the
estate themselves through a bailiff.
Manorialism was a pervasive influence, although it existed
in most parts of England in a modified form. On the manor the
peasants worked the lord’s demesne in return for protection,
housing, and the use of plots of land to cultivate their own
crops. They were tied to the lord and the manor and provided a
resident workforce. The demesne was also worked by slaves who
were fed and housed by the lord.
Although Domesday Book records 112 boroughs, agricul-
ture was the predominant economic activity, with stock rearing
of greater importance in the south-west and arable faming more
important in the east and midlands.
The Domesday Survey was commissioned on Christmas
day, 1085, and it is generally thought that work on Domesday
Book was terminated on the death of William in September
1087. The task was facilitated by the availability of Anglo-Saxon
hidage lists. The counties of England were grouped into (prob-
ably) seven circuits. Each circuit was visited by a team of com-
missioners, bishops, lawyers and lay barons who had no mate-
rial interests in the area. The commissioners were responsible
for circulating a list of questions to land holders, for subjecting
the responses to a review in the county court by the hundred
juries, often consisting of half Englishmen and half Frenchmen,
and for supervising the compilation of county and circuit re-
turns. The circuit returns were then sent to the Exchequer in
Winchester where they were summarized, edited and compiled
into Great Domesday Book.
Unlike modern surveys, individual questionnaire responses
were not treated confidentially but became public knowledge,
3
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being verified in the courts by landholders with local knowledge.
In such circumstances, the opportunities for giving false or mis-
leading evidence were limited.
Domesday Book consists of two volumes, Great (or Exche-
quer) Domesday and Little Domesday. Little Domesday is a de-
tailed original survey return of circuit VII, Essex, Norfolk and
Suffolk. Great Domesday is a summarized version of the other
circuit returns sent to the King’s treasury in Winchester. (It is
thought that the death of William occurred before Essex and
East Anglia could be included in Great Domesday). The two
volumes contain information on the net incomes (referred to as
the annual values), tax assessments and resources of most
manors in England in 1086, some information for 1066, and
sometimes also for an intermediate year. The information was
used to revise tax assessments and document the feudal struc-
ture, “who held what, and owed what, to whom”.1
The study described in this paper is based on data relating
to 574 lay estates in the county of Essex in 1086. Essex was
chosen because more detailed data are available on the counties
described in Little Domesday, and the manorial entries for
Essex are easier to interpret than those of Norfolk and Suffolk.2
1 Further background information on Domesday England is contained in
McDonald and Snooks [1986, Chs. 1 and 2; 1985a, 1985b, 1987a and 1987b] and
McDonald [1998]. For more comprehensive accounts of the history of the period
see Brown [1984], Clanchy [1983], Loyn [1962, 1965, 1983], Stenton [1943,
1951]. Other useful references includes Ballard [1906], Darby [1952], [1977],
Galbraith [1961], Hollister [1965], Lennard [1959], Maitland [1897], Miller and
Hatcher [1978], Postan [1966, 1972], Round [1895, 1903], the articles in Will-
iams [1987] and references cited in McDonald and Snooks [1986]. The Survey is
discussed in McDonald and Snooks [1986, sec. 2.2], the references cited there,
and the articles in Williams [1987]. The Domesday and modern surveys are
compared in McDonald and Snooks [1985c].
2 The data file was compiled by Eva Aker under the direction of the author
with the aid of a Flinders University research grant. The file was compiled
directly from Domesday Book entries in the Victoria County History of Essex
which were checked against a facsimile of the Latin transcript and an English
translation in the so-called Phillimore edition [Morris, 1975]. A general rule of
thumb was developed that only entries for which (1) net income (annual value)
is positive, (2) either ploughteams or livestock entries are positive (or both), and
(3) there is a positive entry for at least one labour variable, were retained for
analysis. In addition, seven other entries were deleted either because they were
implausible or incomplete, and three others because no tax assessment was
recorded. Further details are given in McDonald [1998].
4
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 29 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/6
177McDonald: Tax Fairness in Eleventh Century England
EARLIER STUDIES OF THE GELD
The Domesday tax assessments relate to a non-feudal tax,
the geld, thought to be levied annually by the end of William’s
reign. The tax can be traced back to the danegeld, which was
introduced by King Ethelred in 911 to provide finance to bribe
or fight the Danes. Originally the geld was a land tax assessed at
so much per hide. A hide was traditionally the acreage needed to
support a man and his family, conventionally 120 acres, but in
practice variable from place to place depending on the fertility
of the land. Oldroyd [1997] describes the role of hidage lists and
Geld Rolls in public accounting during the Anglo-Saxon period
and their significance for accounting history. By Norman times
it is thought that, although it retained the nomenclature of a
land tax, the geld was no longer solely a tax on land. In 1086 it
was one of a number of public revenue sources and probably
contributed about a quarter of the total public purse. The geld
was a significant impost on landholders, the rate struck in 1083-
4 of six shillings to the hide, implies the tax amounted to about
15 percent of the annual value of the average Essex lay manor.3
Domesday scholars have written extensively about the tax
assessments. Much of the literature has been influenced by
Round [1895], who considered the assessments to be “artificial”,
in the sense that they were imposed from above via the county
and hundred with little or no consideration of the capacity of an
individual estate to pay the tax. Round’s view was largely based
on a somewhat unsystematic and subjective review of the distri-
bution of the assessments across estates, vills and the hundreds
of counties.
In [1985a] and [1986, Ch. 4], Snooks and I argued that,
contrary to Round’s hypothesis, the tax assessments were based
on a capacity to pay principle, subject to some politically expedi-
ent tax concessions. Similar tax systems operate in most modern
societies and reflect an attempt to collect revenue in a politically
acceptable way.
There is empirical support for our hypothesis. Using re-
gression methods, we showed, for example, that for Essex lay
estates about 65 percent of variation in the tax assessments
could be attributed to variations in manorial annual values
(which measure the net income accruing to the lord) or mano-
rial resources, two alternative ways of measuring capacity to
3 Further information on the geld and related material are contained in
McDonald and Snooks [1986, Ch.4].
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pay. Similar results were obtained for other counties. Capacity
to pay explains from 64 to 89 percent of variation in individual
estate assessment data for the counties of Buckinghamshire,
Cambridgeshire, Essex and Wiltshire, and from 72 to 81 percent
for aggregate data for 29 counties [See McDonald and Snooks
1987a].
Although capacity to pay seems to explain most variation in
tax assessments, some variation remains. Who was treated fa-
vorably? Which estates received a beneficial hidation? And what
factors were associated with beneficial hidation? Clearly, a first
step in addressing these issues is to develop a measure of benefi-
cial hidation.
A simple and appealing measure is based on the idea that
an estate has received beneficial hidation if it has a lower tax
assessment than another estate with the same or lower annual
value (annual value or net income being a measure of capacity
to pay). More formally, the beneficial hidation index (BHI) for
estate i, is defined as the ratio of the maximum tax assessment
of all estates with the same or a lower annual value than estate i,
to the actual tax assessment of estate i. A BHI value of one
corresponds to no beneficial hidation, and a value greater than
one to some beneficial hidation.
JUSTIFICATION OF THE BHI
Some insight into the plausibility of the BHI (just defined)
can be obtained by employing the frontier methodology (some-
times used in production studies, see, for example, Lewin and
Lovell, 1990). In Figure 1, A, B, C, D, and E indicate the tax
assessments and annual values of five (fictitious) estates. (Estate
A, for example, has an annual value of 5 shillings and tax assess-
ment of 4 fiscal acres). To calculate the BHI for an estate, the
maximum tax assessment for the estate’s annual value is re-
quired. The annual values of the five estates are 5, 10, 15, 20 and
30 shillings, and the maximum assessment for estates with equal
or lower assessments 4, 10, 10, 30 and 30 fiscal acres, respec-
tively. The maximum assessment values for different annual val-
ues can be thought of as describing a “tax frontier”.
The frontier that generates the BHI is illustrated in the up-
per diagram of Figure 1. It consists of the “steps”, 0 to the point
vertically below A, that point to A, the horizontal line from A to
the point vertically below B, and so on. Estate BHIs are the ratio
of maximum to the actual tax assessments. For estate E, the
BHI=1.5, all other estates have a BHI=1. This frontier would be
appropriate if the tax regime was one of constant tax assessment
6
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FIGURE 1
Alternative Tax Frontiers
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over annual value intervals (with, for example, estates with an
annual value of 5 shillings and less than 10 shilling paying 4
fiscal acres; those with an annual value of 10 and less than 20
shillings, 10 fiscal acres, and so on), with some beneficial
hidation.
Other tax frontiers and beneficial hidation indexes are plau-
sible. For example, if the underlying tax regime consisted of
multiple constant positive tax rate schedules (with, for example,
estates with an annual value of 5 shillings and less than 10
shillings paying at one tax rate, those with an annual value of 10
and less than 20 shillings at a different rate, and so on), with
some beneficial hidation, then the frontier is generated by start-
ing at 0 and connecting points representing estates by line seg-
ments, so long as the slope of the segment is positive. This
frontier is drawn in the lower diagram of Figure 1. 0 is con-
nected to A, and A to B, because the line segments have positive
slopes; but B is not connected to C and D not connected to E,
because the slopes of the lines would not be positive (implying
zero or negative marginal tax rates). Using this frontier, estates
A, B and D have beneficial hidation indexes of one, the index for
C is two, and for E, two and a half.
Unfortunately we do not know in detail how the Domesday
tax assessments were formulated, so we do not know which is
the most appropriate frontier, and hence beneficial hidation in-
dex.
It is reasonable to ask if it is possible, using empirical meth-
ods, to determine the “true” frontier. For example, is the true
frontier the frontier that gives the closest fit to the data? Unfor-
tunately, this may not be so. Casual inspection of Figure 1 indi-
cates that the frontier in the upper diagram must always fit the
data better than the frontier in the lower diagram (in the sense
that the distances of the data points from the frontier cannot be
greater and will sometimes be smaller), whether or not it is the
true frontier (that is, whether or not the true tax regime is essen-
tially one of constant tax assessment over annual value inter-
vals).
In practice, if there are a reasonable number of observa-
tions, well-distributed over the annual values, frontiers and in-
dexes will be similar. The chosen frontier measures beneficial
hidation more conservatively (in the sense that an estate’s index
will tend to be smaller when measured against it) than most
others. A major advantage in using it is that it can easily be
calculated using linear programming methods [see, for example,
McDonald, 1998, pp. 41-56].
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BENEFICIAL HIDATION IN ESSEX IN 1086
When the frontier was constructed from the tax and annual
value data for the 574 Essex lay estates in 1086, 18 estates lay on
the tax frontier and so had a BHI=1.4 Figure 2 gives the frontier,
the numbers on the frontier being the identification codes of the
estates that form the frontier.
4 For any annual value, the frontier indicates the maximum tax assessment
of all estates with that or a lower annual value, and an estate’s BHI is the ratio of
the maximum assessment to the actual assessment of the estate.
FIGURE 2
Tax Assessment Frontier. Essex Lay Estates, 1086
Table 1 gives the names of the estates and other information
about them. For example, 1 refers to Fobbing an estate with an
annual value of 720 shillings and a tax assessment of 2445.5
fiscal acres. All other estates are represented by points below the
frontier. A few are located by a dot and their identification code,
information about these estates being contained in Table 2.
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Figure 3 exhibits the BHI histogram. Three percent of es-
tates had a BHI=1, about a quarter a BHI less than two, roughly
a half an index value less than three, and three quarters a value
less than five. Some estates had high BHI values. Seven percent
had values of ten or more, with 195 Broxted and largest value of
71.11.
FIGURE 3
Beneficial Hidation Index (BHI) Histogram.
Essex Lay Estates, 1086
Table 1 provides summary information about the 18 estates
lying on the frontier. No obvious patterns are evident for these
estates. Some tenants-in-chief were major magnates, such as
Count Eustace of Boulogne, Count Alan of Brittany, Suen, Sher-
iff of Essex and Geoffrey de Magna Villa, Sheriff of Middlesex,
but several estates had tenants-in-chief who were less significant
lords. In terms of tenancy, nine estates were held in demesne
(that is, were worked by the tenant-in-chief) and nine had a
single sub-tenant. Five of the frontier estates were in the hun-
dred of Dengie, three in Uttlesford, two in Barstable, Lexden and
12
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Tendring, and one in each of Rochford, Beacontree, Chelmsford
and Thurstable. The estates seem to be well-distributed over the
hundreds.
Turning to the estates with very high BHIs (greater than
18), from Table 2 it can be seen that they range from 395
Prested with a small annual value of only 12 shillings to a rela-
tively large estate 247 Tiltey with an annual value of 140 shil-
lings (140 shillings exceeds the annual value of more than three
quarters of the estates in the sample). Of the nine estates with a
BHI greater than 18, most had minor lords as tenants-in-chief,
six were sub-tenancies and three held in demesne. Three estates
were in Hinckford hundred, two in Dunmow, two in Freshwell
half hundred and the others in Tendring and Lexden hundreds.
In footnotes to the Victoria County History entries for Essex
[VCH, 1903], Round commented that four of the nine estates
with very high BHIs had abnormal or nominal assessments.
(These were 195 Broxted, 247 Tiltey, 28 Toppesfield and 500
Sibil Hedingham). He also commented on the low assessments
of other estates with smaller BHIs.5 Round’s comments are
rather unsystematic. By calculating BHIs for each estate it is
possible to identify estates with low or abnormal assessments in
a more comprehensive fashion.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS
AFFECTING BENEFICIAL HIDATION
In the previous section the characteristics of estates with
extreme BHI values were examined. Results of more compre-
hensive analyses of factors associated with beneficial hidation
are contained in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Table 3 lists the mean BHI of estates of the 18 largest ten-
ants-in-chief (those that had more than 10 estates in Essex).
Eudo dapifer has the largest mean value (7.87). The deviation of
this value from the overall mean (4.35) is 3.52. Notice, however,
that the standard deviation of Eudo dapifer’s mean BHI is large
(3.09). The high mean value is mainly due to the high BHIs of
two of Eudo dapifer’s estates: 195 Broxted (BHI=71.11) and 207
Radwinter (BHI=36.00). Richard, son of Count Gilbert also has
5 Examples are the assessments of 374 Fairsted (BHI=15.27) described as
“strangely low” [VCH, 1903, footnote 4, p. 527], 571 Gestingthorp (BHI=8.00)
also referred to as “strangely low” [footnote 9, p. 564], 241 Stambourne and
Toppesfield (BHI=9.88) described as “an almost nominal amount” [footnote 4, p.
502] and 273 High Easter (BHI=3.26) “a very low hidation” [footnote 4, p. 509].
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a high mean BHI (7.27), which is significantly greater than the
overall mean.
Those who were not leniently treated include Robert, son of
Corbutio (mean BHI=2.06), Robert Greno (mean BHI=2.73),
Ralf Baignard (mean BHI=2.87), Ranulf, brother of Ilger (mean
BHI=2.94) and Hugh de Montfort (mean BHI=2.97).
TABLE 3
Mean BHI of Estates of 18 Largest Tenants-in-chief.
Essex Lay Estates, 1086
Tenant in chief Mean Standard Deviation Number of
BHI deviation from overall estates in
 mean sample
Count Eustace 4.25 0.56 -0.10 71
Suen of Essex 4.19 0.48 -0.16 57
Geoffrey de Magna Villa 3.55 0.31 -0.80 42
Robert Greno 2.73 0.29 -1.62 44
Richard son of Count Gilbert 7.27 0.88 2.92 29
Ranulf Peverel 4.26 1.03 -0.09 37
Ralf Baignard 2.87 0.37 -1.48 29
Eudo dapifer 7.87 3.09 3.52 24
William de Warene 3.93 0.46 -0.42 18
Ranulf brother of Ilger 2.94 0.41 -1.41 17
Hugh de Montfort 2.97 0.47 -1.38 17
Hamo dapifer 4.33 0.66 -0.02 15
Peter de Valognes 4.76 1.31 0.41 14
Aubrey de Ver 4.76 0.82 0.41 16
Robert son of Corbutio 2.06 0.35 -2.29 11
Count Alan 4.50 1.13 0.15 9
Roger de Ramis 5.66 1.17 1.31 12
John son of Waleram 5.34 1.14 0.99 8
Others 4.77 0.51 0.42 104
There is a clear tendency for the tenants-in-chief with the
largest number of estates in Essex to have less favorable assess-
ments. 10 of the 12 largest tenants-in-chief have a mean BHI
below the overall mean (4.35), and all but one of the remaining
six tenants-in-chief a mean above the overall mean. The vast
majority of tenants-in-chief fall in the ‘other’ category. Their
mean BHI is also above the overall mean, indicating that they
tended to be treated more leniently.
A more objective way of assessing whether, in general, ten-
ants-in-chief were treated equally is to carry out a statistical test
using the full sample of observations. A robust statistical test of
14
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the null hypothesis that the mean BHIs for the tenants-in-chief
are equal, resulted in rejection of the null at the five and one
percent significance levels.6 The test indicates that who the ten-
ant-in-chief was is a significant factor influencing how estates
were taxed, with some, mainly smaller, tenants-in-chief receiv-
ing more favorable treatment than others.
Figure 4 is a map indicating the Essex hundred divisions
and Table 4 gives a breakdown of mean BHI by hundreds. A
statistical test indicates that the BHI varied significantly (at the
five and one percent levels) with hundred location.7 Hundreds
FIGURE 4
Domesday Essex Hundreds
6 The test was carried out by regressing the BHI on tenant-in-chief dummy
variables taking the value 1, if the tenant-in-chief held the estate; 0, otherwise.
Since the regression diagnostics indicated heteroskedasticity in the distur-
bances, White’s [1980] heteroskedasticity-consistent test was used. On the null,
the test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a F-distribution with 18 and 555
degrees of freedom. The test statistic value was 4.293 which, to five decimal
places, has a p-value of zero.
7 The test was carried out in a similar way to the test for equality of the
tenant-in-chief means (using White’s method, see previous footnote). The test
statistic value (asymptotically F-distributed with 21 and 552 degrees of freedom
on the null) was 11.085, which, to five decimal places, gives a p-value of zero.
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for which estates received milder assessments included Fresh-
well half hundred (mean BHI=8.94), Hinckford (mean
BHI=7.43), Dunmow (mean BHI=6.60), Lexden (mean
BHI=5.57) and Maldon half hundred (mean BHI=5.40). Those
less-well treated were Beacontree (mean BHI=1.55), Dengie
(mean BHI=2.34), Clavering hundred and half hundred (mean
BHI=2.37), Winstree (mean BHI=2.38), Waltham (mean
BHI=2.39), Chafford (mean BHI=2.43), Chelmsford (mean
BHI=2.52) and Barstable (mean BHI=2.55).
TABLE 4
Mean BHI of Estates by Hundred. Essex Lay Estates, 1086
Tenant in chief Mean Standard Deviation Number of
BHI deviation from overall estates in
of mean  mean sample
Barstable 2.55 0.21 -1.80 35
Beacontree 1.55 0.10 -2.80 9
Chafford 2.43 0.39 -1.92 12
Chelmsford 2.52 0.14 -1.83 48
Dengie 2.34 0.25 -2.01 41
Dunmow 6.60 1.44 2.25 48
Clavering hundred and
half hundred 2.37 0.33 -1.98 10
Freshwell half hundred 8.94 2.18 4.59 17
Harlow 3.61 0.88 -0.74 18
Harlow half hundred 2.97 0.77 -1.38 3
Hinckford 7.43 0.67 3.08 73
Lexden 5.57 1.21 1.22 31
Ongar 5.09 0.51 0.74 34
Rochford 4.10 0.57 -0.25 36
Tendring 3.74 0.74 -0.61 48
Uttlesford 2.90 0.27 -1.45 39
Waltham 2.39 0.80 -1.96 4
Winstree 2.38 0.26 -1.97 15
Witham 4.83 0.75 0.48 26
Maldon half hundred 5.40 3.60 1.05 2
Thunreslau half hundred 3.30 0.72 -1.05 3
Thurstable 2.89 0.36 -1.46 22
The above analysis indicates that all estates were not treated
equally, but that tax treatment varied significantly across ten-
ants-in-chief and the hundreds. An obvious question to ask is, if,
when we allow for the hundred effect, the tenant-in-chief effect
16
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is still significant, and, if, when we allow for the tenant-in-chief
effect the hundred effect remains significant. Extending the ar-
gument we could examine the relationship between the BHI and
all factors that might plausibly be expected to affect it and for
which information is available at the estate level. Multiple re-
gression could then be used to estimate the relationship and test
whether one factor (for example, who the tenant-in-chief was)
significantly affects the index when all other factors are con-
trolled for.
This approach was implemented. As well as who the tenant-
in-chief was and hundred location, information is available, es-
tate by estate, on whether the estate was close to an urban cen-
ter, the size of the estate, the kind of agriculture practiced and
the tenure arrangement on the estate, all factors that could af-
fect an estate’s tax assessment. Table 5 exhibits the main results
of a regression of the BHI on variables measuring these charac-
teristics.8 Details of the implementation of the hidage system are
now largely unknown, so the regression will provide empirical
evidence as to whether particular groups or activities received
special treatment, and, given these special considerations,
whether the assessments were evenly distributed over the
county.
The results show that the tenant-in-chief and hundred ef-
fects remain significant when other factors are allowed to vary
in the multiple regression. Whether the estate was close to
Maldon or Colchester was also a significant factor. The BHI for
8 Tenant-in-chief was indicated by 18 dummy variables (the ith, i=1 . . . 18,
taking the value 1, if the ith largest tenant-in-chief held the estate; 0, otherwise;
the intercept measuring the effect when none of the 18 largest tenants-in-chief
held the estate), and the hundred location by 21 dummies (with the intercept
measuring the effect of location in Thurstable hundred). Colchester and Maldon
were the main towns in Essex. The effect of proximity to an urban centre was
measured by a dummy variable, taking the value 1, if the estate was in an
approximate six mile radius of Colchester or Maldon (allowing for topology); 0,
otherwise. Size was measured by the single best indicator of the economic size
of an estate, the estate’s annual value. An index of whether production was
mainly arable or grazing is given by the grazing/arable ratio, defined as livestock
less cattle and beasts (which were required for ploughing) divided by the num-
ber of ploughteams on the estate. (Livestock less cattle and beasts is a weighted
average of swine, sheep and goats with prices as weights. Three estates had no
ploughteams. For them, the ratio was set at 2000, the largest ratio value for
estates with some ploughteams being 1376). Finally, tenure was measured by
dummy variable taking the value 1, if the estate was held in demesne; 0, other-
wise. Test statistics are heteroskedasticity-consistent tests statistics obtained by
White’s [1980] method.
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estates close to these towns was, on average, 1.73 lower than for
other estates. Economic size (measured by annual value) of the
estate also significantly affected the index value. A large estate
(with an annual value of 320 shillings) had an average index
value 1.80 less than a small estate (with an annual value of 20
shillings). Whether or not an estate was held in demesne was a
significant factor at the five percent level. Estates held in de-
mesne, on average, had a BHI 0.91 less than those that were sub
or mesne-tenancies. The variable measuring the mix of arable
and grazing agriculture on an estate was not a significant corre-
late.
CONCLUSION
The paper has presented the results of an investigation into
the incidence of favorable tax assessment (hidation) in
Domesday Essex. Frontier methods were used to derive a mea-
sure of beneficial hidation, and estates with favorable and un-
favorable assessments identified. Tenants-in-chief and local
areas (hundreds) of the county with lenient assessments were
discovered, and regression methods used to assess the sig-
nificance of the association of characteristics of estates and ben-
eficial hidation. Factors significantly associated with beneficial
hidation were the tenant-in-chief holding the estate (hida-
tion tended to be less beneficial for the tenants-in-chief hold-
ing a large number of estates in Essex), the hundred location,
TABLE 5
Regression of BHI on Estate Characteristics.
Essex Lay Estates, 1086
Test statistic Distribution P-value
on null
Tenant-in-chief effect 1.857* F(18,530) .017
Hundred effect 5.164** F(21,530) .000
Urban centre effect -3.1** t(530) .002
Size (annual value) effect -4.0** t(530) .000
Kind of agriculture (grazing/
arable ratio) effect -1.1 t(530) .255
Tenure effect -2.2* t(530) .028
Note: The tests are heteroskedasticity-consistent tests [see White, 1980].
** indicates significant at the five percent level and
** significant at the one percent level. R2=.17
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proximity to an urban center (estates remote from the urban
centers being more favorably treated), economic size of the es-
tate (larger estates being less favorably treated) and tenure (es-
tates held as sub-tenancies having more lenient assessments).
The kind of farming undertaken (arable or grazing) was not a
significant factor.
The details of the levying of the geld in 1086 are largely lost
in time, but the evidence clearly indicates that the manorial tax
assessments were based on a capacity to pay principle (as mea-
sured by the manor’s annual value), and the analysis of estate
BHIs shows that other factors also had a significant influence.
In most tax systems, certain groups or activities receive con-
cessions and the administrative process induces unevenness in
the assessments. The BHI analysis indicates that, allowing for
the capacity of an estate to meet the tax, some estates were
indeed favored above others. The results show that some ten-
ants-in-chief were treated more leniently than others, and, inter-
estingly, it tended to be the tenants-in-chief holding fewer rather
than more estates in the county. At the margin, the assessment
system may have tended to favor the less wealthy because, it was
also found that smaller estates and those held by sub-tenants
received lower assessments, and urban estates (often held by the
wealthy), higher assessments.
The fact that there was a significant hundred assessment
differential, suggests that administrative factors affected the
hidage system. This could have been because the assessments
were made at different dates or with (slightly) more rigor in
some hundreds than others. As for concessions being given
when particular activities were undertaken, the regression pro-
vides no evidence of this. In particular, the tax system did not
favor arable activity over animal husbandry or vice versa.
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